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 Abstract 
Within the rich literature on regional integration and immigration, many scholars discuss border 
issues. Nonetheless, rarely are border areas comparatively examined, despite the fact that they are 
most exposed to these international phenomena. This paper comparatively analyzes the development 
of regional politics and economies in border areas in Europe and North America, and its impact on 
immigration regimes. It responds to three inter-related research questions: 1) How has regional 
integration affected cross-border cooperation at the sub-national level? 2) How have recent socio-
economic transformations related to cross-border cooperation affected migration regimes? 3) How 
well have border control strategies responded to recent changes in migration regimes? It contends that 
border integration is actually the most effective means of border control.  
Keywords 
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I. Introduction 
Security issues, such as organized crime, and terrorism have directly raised the visibility of border 
control on public agendas in Europe and the United States (US). In response to this heightened 
attention, nation-states have generally followed coercive border control strategies aimed at stopping 
clandestine migration and human smuggling. One of the most recent measures proposed by the US 
Congress in December 2005, would entail, should it be implemented, the extension of the current 
border wall system (in place in four points of the border) to the entire length of the US-Mexico divide. 
This plan has provoked indignation throughout Latin America where leaders, especially Mexican 
President Vicente Fox, have decried the measure as ‘shameful.’ 
Because immigration has been politically framed as a security threat, government responses have 
increasingly focused on the notion of ‘control,’ defined as the prevention of unauthorized migration 
across state borders. In response, many scholars (i.e. Cornelius) and political actors have questioned 
the effectiveness of such strategies. In fact, borders have received prominent attention in other political 
spheres, such as those related to labour market expansion, trans-national social movements, 
environmental conservation, etc. where border cities and regions have historically been recognized as 
dynamic areas. Many frontiers are known as places of opportunity and expansion, especially when 
they separate industrialized and developing countries. 
This paper comparatively examines the relationship between immigration and regional integration 
in Europe and North America through the study of border areas located in both continents. By 
studying the impact of these global phenomena on sub-national communities, the paper identifies the 
mechanisms that best explain the foundations of clandestine migration and its relationship to regional 
integration models. It does so by responding to three inter-related research questions: 1) how has 
regional integration affected cross-border co-operation at the sub-national level?; 2) how have recent 
socio-economic transformations related to cross-border co-operation affected migration regimes in 
these border communities?; 3) how well have immigration control strategies responded to these recent 
changes in migration regimes?  
Research Design  
This paper focuses on regional integration and the politics of immigration in two border cases, 1) San 
Diego, USA-Tijuana, Mexico and 2) Bari, Italy-Durres, Albania. These cases are part of a larger study 
on the impact of regional integration on four border communities. The other two cases in the overall 
research framework are Northern France-Southern Belgium (area of historic Flanders) and Cucuta, 
Colombia and San Cristobal, Venezuela. These communities were chosen for this study for specific 
demographic, political and economic characteristics. In terms of their similarities, all of these cases are 
traditional migration areas. Second, organized crime has created human smuggling/trafficking rings in 
each community. Third, each case has historically been considered ‘integrated’ due to bi-national 
ethnic ties, economic cooperation or colonial relationships. Finally, regional integration developed in 
each specific area during the same time period (early 1990s) due to lagging labour markets and the decision 
by local elites to restructure the foundations of the local economies. 
These cases were also chosen due to various traits that make them ‘most different.’ San Diego-
Tijuana and traditional Flanders represent cases where there is strong asymmetry along the border. In 
the former, there is little political interaction between the case cities’ local governments. Limited 
collaboration occurs in the economic sphere as chambers of commerce, and planning agencies work to 
stimulate local markets. In the latter, political cooperation occurs on a daily basis but economic 
collaboration is lacking due to differences in economic structures. Conversely, demographic and 
economic symmetry exists between Bari-Durres and Cucuta-San Cristobal. Nonetheless, significant 
differences remain. Cross-border co-operation between Bari and Durres encompasses both the political Harlan Koff 
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and economic arenas as collaboration exists between firms, planning agencies, chambers of 
commerce, city, provincial and regional governments, and non-governmental organisations. Moreover, 
because Bari is found in Italy’s poorer south, its economy suffers from many of the structural 
problems found in Durres, such as a large informal economy, high unemployment, limited 
infrastructure, etc. Cucuta, Colombia and San Cristobal, Venezuela demonstrate little collaboration in 
either the political or economic arenas due to the deteriorated relationship between the Colombian and 
Venezuelan governments and the militarization of the border.  
Key Concepts  
For the purposes of this study, ‘regional integration’ is defined as the cession of sovereignty in policy 
arenas through multilateral agreements that transfer decision-making powers in those arenas to the 
supranational level. Specifically, the paper compares the institutional and legal differences in these 
arrangements between the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). ‘Immigration regimes’ are defined not only by the number of immigrants in the case of 
study, but by the qualitative differences in the types of immigration present in the selected cases. 
‘Clandestine migration’ refers to those migrants who cross state borders without proper authorization. 
‘Human smuggling’ is defined as the facilitation of unauthorized migration for economic gain, and 
‘Human trafficking’ regards the facilitation of unauthorized migration for the purposes of future 
exploitation in illicit activities. 
The direct focus of the study is security in border areas. As in most of the literature on security 
issues (i.e. Williams), I address this key concept both as ‘public security’ referring to threats to public 
order and ‘human security’ defined as the maintenance of human integrity or human dignity. Finally, the 
term ‘border areas’ concerns sub-national communities located in the proximity of nation-state boundaries.  
Methods 
In order to complete this study, library research on both regional integration (EU and NAFTA) and 
immigration was carried out at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European 
University Institute, the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies at the University of California, 
San Diego. Socio-economic data on the sub-national cases was gathered at local universities, local 
government development agencies, chambers of commerce, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). Information regarding political cooperation was obtained through personal interviews with 
representatives of local government and NGOs.  
Literature Review 
This research project addresses three distinct bodies of literature and attempts to connect inter-related 
arguments found within them. First, it aims to fill a hole in the emerging literature on border 
communities. Numerous scholars, such as Blatter, Maganda, Brooks and Fox, Kirchner, etc. have 
analyzed the impact of regional integration programs on various aspects of local policy-making in 
border cities. While these studies are significant, they rarely employ comparative methods. The most 
extensive book in this field is Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in the Era of Globalization 
edited by Demetrious Papademetriou and Deborah Meyers. This volume presents research on recent 
transformations in border communities in Europe and North America. Nonetheless, it is a collection of 
cases and it does not employ the comparative method. Its theoretical introduction, however, accurately 
presents two arguments: 1) border regions are those most exposed to international phenomena, and 2) 
local actors often follow policy strategies that contradict national measures. This framework is the 
basis of this paper. 
The second body of literature that is addressed by this research is that on immigration control. This 
scholarship has been developed extensively. Authors such as Cornelius, Money, Lavanex, Lahav, and On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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Geddes, to name a few, have analyzed the domestic and international pressures that have led to 
protectionist policy-making in immigration politics. Nonetheless, one of the weak points of these 
works is that they often fail to discuss immigration policies within the framework of general political 
systems. Some authors, such as Holliefield and Bretell, Freeman and Weiner have addressed this 
deficiency. This paper aims to contribute to this niche as well. 
Finally, the research presented in this paper addresses issues raised by the current scholarship on 
comparative regional integration. Authors such as Mattli, Appendini and Bislev, Laursen, and 
Chambers and Smith have examined regional integration models in comparative perspective 
discussing issues such as: the national impact of regional integration, the theoretical arguments for 
regional integration, global incentives for regional integration, and the impact of different institutional 
frameworks on regional regimes. This paper aims to address the impact of regional integration on 
power in sub-national communities in different geographical contexts. By doing so, it addresses an 
area that is lacking in this international scholarship. 
Theoretical Arguments 
The paper is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, part two briefly outlines regional 
development strategies in Europe and North America and their impact on Mexico and Albania. Part 
three analyzes the impact of regional integration on the two border case areas. Part four discusses 
recent border control measures in Europe and North America and their effects on clandestine 
migration in the case regions. Finally, part five, presents theoretical conclusions. 
The paper argues that regional integration significantly affects local patterns of cross-border co-
operation. However, it also questions the notion that regional integration necessarily creates ‘border 
integration.’ In fact, it contends that levels of border integration vary due to different forms of cross-
border cooperation in the economic and political arenas. The paper then contends that immigration 
control policies based on the unilateral use of force at the border cannot be effective unless they 
address the socio-economic contexts, created by regional integration, that significantly affect 
migration regimes. These socio-economic factors have, in part, been created by co-operation between 
local governments which have implemented policies aimed at stimulating cross-border economic 
exchanges. By ignoring this background to migration and focusing simply on border controls, states 
merely push immigration underground by improving the opportunity structures for organized crime 
groups that have created networks for human smuggling and human trafficking. The cases presented 
suggest that developed states need to address the underlying bases of migration if they are to manage 
this issue with any success. This is best accomplished through multi-level governance and cross-
border local cooperation. 
II. Regional Integration and Development in Europe and North America 
Since World War II, regional integration has taken many forms. These models have been thoroughly 
discussed in the comparative literature on regionalism (see Laursen, 2003, Mattli, 1999, Appendini 
and Bislev, 1999). Rather than focus on the theoretical debates that surround regional integration, the 
purpose of this section is to briefly present the evolving contexts in which border politics have 
developed in Europe and North America. By describing these models of integration and their 
corresponding development strategies in Mexico and Albania, this section provides the necessary 
background for the analysis presented in part three.  
The European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement Compared 
Stephen Clarkson (2000) asserts that comparing the European Union (EU) and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is like comparing apples and oranges.
1 When the Treaty of Rome Harlan Koff 
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was signed in 1957, European integration was based on the tremendous need to reconstruct the 
continent, as well as political idealism tied to notions of international peace and co-operation. For this 
reason, the concept benefited from a tacit consensus throughout Europe allowing the forefathers of 
European integration to lay the foundations for integration in the political, economic and social spheres. 
Since that time, integration objectives have shifted away from responses to security issues and the 
implementation of ideals concerning peace, and moved towards the efficient management of economic 
forces in the global economy. As regional integration developed in Europe and other parts of the 
world, it gradually became linked more closely with political and economic competitiveness.  
This is visible in the differences between the EU and NAFTA. Because the EU represents a model 
of early integration, its institutional and legal mechanisms are more developed and its political 
objectives are more ambitious than those included in NAFTA, an example of later, market-based 
integration. These differences are summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: EU and NAFTA Compared 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 





Common Identity  Commitment to 
Harmonisation 
EU  Balanced Economic/Political  Medium-High  High 
NAFTA  Neoliberal  Economic-
Regulatory  Low Low 
   
European and North American Development Strategies 
The political and economic disparities between the EU and NAFTA are clearly evident in the 
development strategies that they promote. The greatest difference between the economic aspects of 
regional integration in Europe and North America regard the notion of equity. In North America, 
regional harmonisation is not an objective of NAFTA and socio-economic equity has never been part 
of the agreement. Conversely, European integration has institutionalized the principle of equity though 
regional funding and social programs aimed at reducing ‘the differences between the various regions 
and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.’
2 EU strategies focus on reducing disparities in the 
economic, political and social spheres, while NAFTA virtually ignores the latter two arenas (see Table 2).  
TABLE 2: Commitment to Development 
  ECONOMIC MARKETS  POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS  CIVIL SOCIETY 
EU  High High  High 
NAFTA  High  Medium (Peripheral Interest)  Low 
 
The impact of these differences has been demonstrated by many scholars of development, such as 
Pastor, Hansen, and Woodruff. Integration in North America has weakened the relative positions of 
peripheral areas whereas integration in Europe has strengthened them. A comparison between the 
strongest and weakest national economies in each regional system shows that the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the United States is 6.5 times higher than that of Mexico whereas the GDP of 
Germany is only 2.4 times that of Portugal. Moreover, within Mexico, per capita income within the 
poorer southern states is sixty two percent less than that found in the wealthier northeast.
3 The impacts 
of these differing approaches to development are evident in recent economic trends in Mexico and Albania. On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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NAFTA and Mexico and the EU and Albania  
Scholars of development, such as Larry Diamond, have long identified three arenas that contribute to 
stability and prosperity: market liberalisation, the presence of transparent political institutions and fair 
legal structures, and cohesive civil society. The greatest difference between regional integration in 
Europe and North America regards the emphasis placed on the various sectors of development.  
Under the auspices of NAFTA, it is clearly evident that political reform is not a priority. Instead, it 
is a secondary objective of the agreement to be achieved through economic reform. This outcome 
occurred for two reasons. First, as stated earlier, NAFTA was championed by US corporations with 
little interest in political reform. Due to these external restraints, US leaders (especially President 
George Herbert Bush), had little opportunity to include democratisation on the NAFTA agenda. 
Second, Mexican leaders also opposed a dual agenda. When the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) began liberalizing the economy after the shocks of the early and mid 1980s, democratic reform 
did not follow. Instead, PRI leaders maintained oligarchic political structures that permitted them to 
remain in power. Political reform did not even become part of Mexico’s agenda until Vicente Fox and 
the Partido del Accion Nacional (PAN) won the 2000 presidential election, a full eight years after 
NAFTA was signed.  
The results of this approach have been clear in Mexico. Due to trade liberalisation, many economic 
indicators demonstrate improvements in Mexico’s overall economy. Foreign investment has increased 
(stock of foreign investment doubled between 1994 and 1999 from US$42 billion to US$83 billion), as 
has gross domestic product (to one trillion US dollars), exports in manufacturing (from US$41.6 
billion to US$105.9 billion), and employment (official unemployment rate decreased from 3.7 percent 
in 1993 to 2.3 percent in 1999). However, social marginalization has also boomed as precarious labour 
has led to a relative decline in wages (by 13.2 percent) and regional disparities in economic 
performance have also grown (25 of 32 states account for less than three percent each of total 
production in Mexico).
4 Politically, reform of the justice system and the institutionalisation of human 
rights have been slow to develop. Furthermore corruption continues to run rampant even after the 
change in power in 2000. Public dissatisfaction with President Fox combined with some high profile 
scandals that have included ruling PAN officials have actually made a quick return to power for the 
PRI a legitimate possibility in the next presidential elections. This is especially true given the PAN 
and PRI’s successful campaign to destitute the leading Left-wing candidate for President, Andres 
Manuel Lopez Obrador from his position as Mayor of Mexico City. This act has created mass public 
outcry and instigated international criticism that it is a blow to democracy in Mexico.  
Conversely, despite numerous challenges to development, democracy in Albania has been 
consolidated more evenly and international organisations, such as the World Bank, Council of Europe 
and the EU have praised the country for the progress that has been accomplished both politically and 
economically. For example, Nadir Mohammed, World Bank Country Manager for Albania has stated:  
We are encouraged by this performance and commend the government of Albania for its 
commitment. Major regulatory reforms have put the banking sector on a firmer footing, energy-
pricing reforms are reducing the fiscal burden, and privatisation is picking up momentum. Albania 
is also making important progress in its path towards EU integration.
5 
In fact, since the fall of the Communist regime in 1991, Albania’s economic markets and political 
institutions have progressively stabilized, despite significant internal and external challenges, such as 
the 1997 pension crisis and the military conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia. While these events 
created added difficulties for the development process, they also led to heightened foreign aid and 
political support. Unlike Mexico, Albania has benefited from significant foreign assistance directed at 
political and social incorporation, especially from the EU. Since 1991, Albania has received over one 
billion euros in EU assistance.
6 At the beginning of the 1990s, financial aid targeted food and 
emergency relief. Since then, the EU has heavily subsidized economic and political reform through the 
PHARE (Pologne et Hongrie: Assistance pour la Restructuration Economique) and CARDS Harlan Koff 
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(Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation) programs aimed at: 
developing a fair judicial system and transparent legal structures, establishing basic infrastructure, 
improving customs and tax collection, developing civil society, strengthening education and 
environmental protection, and opening Albania to its neighbours through transportation programs and 
cultural and educational exchanges.  
These investments have significantly improved Albania’s political, economic and social situations. 
Following the fall of Communism, the country was confronted with deep social divisions, institutional 
inefficiency and underdeveloped markets. Gains in all three arenas have been evident. Politically, a 
stable parliamentary republic has been established, public administration has been improved 
dramatically, and a fair judicial system has begun to develop (which remains one of Mexico’s greatest 
problems). One of Albania’s largest institutional challenges has been the development of an effective 
tax and customs administration. Because of the progress accomplished in this area, tax revenues 
increased twenty six percent in 2000 with respect to 1999 which contributed to a decrease in the fiscal 
deficit from 11.5 percent of GDP to 9.2 percent.
7 
Other economic indicators reflect the positive effects of political development on economic 
markets. Overall, Albania has shown steady growth since 1991 (except for 1997 due to the 
aforementioned pension scandal) with yearly improvements of seven to eight percent of the country’s 
overall GDP.
8 The service sector has the most dynamic growth rate at 20.1 percent, followed by 
construction (18.4 percent) and industry (13.6 percent). Foreign direct investment has also increased 
from US$20 million in 1992 to US$135 million in 2002 and inflation is at its lowest point since the 
economic transition began fourteen years ago.
9 Finally, remittances from Albanian’s living abroad are 
estimated at approximately US$440 million.
10 
This final statistic, however, touches on many of the social problems that continue to afflict 
Albania. Due to the weakness of civil society, the importance of poverty, the structural problems in 
education, the strength of organized crime, and low wages, many Albanians have chosen to emigrate. 
It is estimated that 500,000-600,000 Albanians left the country in the 1990s, creating a problematic 
‘brain drain.’ Moreover, approximately 36,000 migrants pass through the country each year on their 
way to the European Union.
11 Albania has become of the busiest transit points in Europe for human 
smugglers and traffickers. For this reason, special attention has been placed on police training and 
border controls. In fact, after having been considered one of the ‘most closed’ countries in Europe 
throughout the Communist regime of Enver Hoxha, Albania has become one of the continent’s most 
open, due to its geographic position. For this reason, border issues have become as publicly prominent 
as they have traditionally been in Mexico. This is the focus of the section three.  
III. The Impact of Regional Integration on Border Communities 
Since the early 1990s, asymmetry and shifts in balances/uses of power have been a central focus of 
border studies. Many scholars (i.e. Blatter, 2004, Papademetriou, 2001, Kirchner, 1998) have noted 
that local actors often follow economic and political strategies that counteract policies instituted at the 
national level. Moreover, excluded groups on both sides of a border often unify their efforts to further 
a common political cause (i.e. Brooks and Fox, 2002). What has not been sufficiently examined is 
what types of cross-border co-operation develop at the local level from regional integration and how 
these varying models of political co-operation relate to the management and restructuring of economic 
markets. These questions have not been analyzed closely in much of the literature. For example, 
Joachim Blatter correctly argues that scholars of borders often assume two theoretical points related to 
globalization: 1) that political economy represents the increasing integration of the political and 
economic spheres and 2) regional integration creates cross-border co-operation by definition. 
This section examines border politics and markets in San Diego-Tijuana and Bari-Durres. Rather 
than simply focusing on how integration has occurred in these communities, this section questions 
whether integration has occurred at all, and if so, to what extent? Its basic premise is that border On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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integration involves a series of changing relationships that encompass markets and political systems. 
These relationships may shorten or lengthen the distances between communities, but these 
communities remain separate entities within each case of study. By focusing on the character of the 
relationships that have developed between local political institutions, as well as the nature of cross-
border economic ties between cities, this section attempts to describe how the regional integration 
models described above have influenced these border communities. These outcomes will then be 
utilized as the basis of the analysis of immigration policies presented in part four.  
Defining Border Integration: A Qualitative Question 
Globalization has certainly increased the number of cross-border transactions and it has accelerated 
rates of economic exchange. Urban planners interested in border questions often examine this latter 
aspect of globalization. For example, Steven P. Erie, one of the leading scholars of the San Diego-
Tijuana region’s economic transformation, has publicly called for improved transportation 
infrastructure on both sides of the border because current capabilities are insufficient for faster 
exchanges of commodities and services. Similarly, scholars of economic development in the Adriatic 
Basin (which includes Bari and Durres), such as Gianfranco Viesti, have acknowledged that increased 
economic interdependence in this geographic area has created a need for improved airports, seaports, 
and roads. 
While globalization has certainly affected the volume and speed of economic exchanges, it cannot 
be taken for granted that it has created market integration in border areas. Integration, defined as the 
incorporation of market structures into (even loosely) unified economic bodies, is not found in all 
border communities. Through an analysis of socio-economic changes in San Diego-Tijuana and Bari-
Durres, this section aims to show that communities in border areas do not necessarily need to be 
considered integrated, even if their patterns of development are similar. Moreover, these cases show 
that regional integration models have an impact on how political and economic co-operation occurs at 
the local level. 
San Diego-Tijuana 
The San Diego-Tijuana area represents the busiest border in the world with about seventy million 
crossings each year. The region’s economy is worth US$100 billion which ranks it as the thirty sixth 
largest economy in the world. Its population has skyrocketed to over four million inhabitants, 2.8 
million of whom reside in San Diego and 1.2 million of whom live in Tijuana.
12 For these reasons, this 
case is often considered a ‘well-integrated’ border. In fact, this demographic and economic growth has 
been significantly affected by NAFTA as the importance of this area developed with the introduction 
of regional integration. Following World War II, both San Diego and Tijuana were only minor cities 
with limited industrial bases. Due to the region’s climate and location, both cities received significant 
amounts of internal migrants. Moreover, San Diego’s economy received a boost from the defence 
industry, as Navy and Marine bases located in the county were expanded. Nonetheless, the signing of 
NAFTA in 1993 accelerated expansion tremendously. 
Since that year, both of these cities experienced major transformations of their economic 
foundations. Between 1990 and 1992, 53,000 jobs were lost in San Diego County.
13 This represented 
five percent of the local workforce. Because of this recession, local officials effectively planned and 
negotiated a shift to a ‘New Economy’ based on high technology. They identified nine clusters in 
high-tech fields, including biomedical production, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, computer 
software, wireless telecommunications, electronic and computer manufacturing, business services, 
financial services, defence and transportation manufacturing, and environmental technology. This shift 
fundamentally changed the focus of the San Diego economy from one based on regional markets to an 
economy oriented towards international exports. Not surprisingly, due to the timing of this 
transformation as well as San Diego’s geographic location, Mexico became the primary target of these Harlan Koff 
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exports. Whereas other California cities, notably Los Angeles and San Francisco have fostered east-
west connections between Asia and Europe, San Diego’s ties run north-south. This is obvious in its 
trade with Mexico which receives forty four percent of the city’s exports, compared to twenty three 
percent for all Asian states, and nine percent for Canada. Furthermore, of the 126,000 international 
passengers who pass through San Diego’s airport every year, 102,000 are estimated to be Mexican.
14 
Similarly, Tijuana has greatly benefited from NAFTA. The city has an official growth rate of 6.9 
percent each year. Its population has increased from 740,000 in the late 1970s to 1.3 million in 2000. 
Actually, local planners expect growth to continue at even higher rates doubling the population again 
by 2020.
15 This demographic expansion has significantly contributed to the development of the local 
maquiladora economy.
16 Even though there is much internal migration to Tijuana from poorer parts of 
Mexico, the city has a highly educated workforce. The official literacy rate is ninety seven percent. 
The local Chamber of Commerce has utilized high rates of education to lure companies such as 
SONY, Panasonic, and Samsung to the area. In fact, Tijuana has one of the highest concentrations of 
specialized workers in Mexico and the highest concentration of maquiladoras in the country.
17 
Of course, the city’s economic growth has also been aided by its geographic position. Tijuana has 
proclaimed itself ‘the television capital of the world’ because of the strong presence of maquiladoras. 
These televisions, radios, stereos, etc. are mainly produced for the US market. They represent the 
leading imports from Mexico that cross into the US at the San Diego border. Moreover, in 2002, they 
were 48.6 percent of the all exports from Mexico with a value of US$18,680 million.
18 
While these trends that have enveloped San Diego and Tijuana are encouraging, they cannot be 
considered the fruit of cross-border co-operation. In fact, they closely reflect the market-based model, 
described above, that was implemented under NAFTA. Little cross-border governmental co-operation 
between these cities exists. A planning agency called SANDAG (San Diego Association of 
Governments) has instituted a Border Committee which formally includes officials from all of the 
border cities in Southern California (including San Diego) and Northern Baja California (including 
Tijuana). However, a member of this committee stated during a personal interview that the Mexican 
representatives do not actively participate and their input is largely symbolic. Most scholars of this 
border, (i.e. Carmen Maganda, 2005) point to two obstacles that have blocked cross-border co-
operation. First, the asymmetry of power at the border offers little incentive for leaders in San Diego 
to enter into institutionalized dialogue with their Mexican counterparts. Economically, San Diego is 
ten times wealthier than Tijuana (added value of US$90 billion versus US$11 billion
19). For this 
reason, there have actually been anti-border reactions amongst the electorate in San Diego when 
integration has been discussed. Because local leaders lose more votes that they gain by opening new 
avenues of co-operation, they avoid such dialogue. 
Leaders in Tijuana have expressed equal concern about sovereignty in negotiations with 
counterparts from San Diego. Due to the exploitative behaviour of US officials in the past, many 
Mexican leaders, especially those in border communities, worry about ceding sovereignty in political 
and economic matters. Furthermore, because there is significant anti-US sentiment in the area, many 
leaders worry about the impact of cross-border collaboration on their own re-election chances. For its 
part, the Mexican Consulate in San Diego has focused its energies on protecting the rights of Mexican 
migrants in the city who, due to aggressive behaviour by local immigration officials, often risk 
deportation when their situations are not regular. For this reason it has had limited involvement in 
cross-border co-operation. 
This situation demonstrates numerous difficulties that have prevented political collaboration 
between San Diego and Tijuana. In fact, due to the lack of co-operation in the political sphere, the 
above-mentioned economic sectors have expanded without integration into a cross-border market. 
Instead of a single, integrated economy one finds two separate parallel markets. Tijuana does export 
goods to the United States, but San Diego is not considered a consumer market. It is merely a point of 
passage to other areas in California and beyond, especially Los Angeles, with whom Tijuana has On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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tighter political and trade relationships. Similarly, San Diego’s high-tech products are destined for 
markets in Mexico’s interior, by-passing Tijuana. These facts suggest that consumption is a much 
better indicator of integration than production. 
A second observation from the San Diego-Tijuana case concerning the impact of supranational 
integration regards changes internal to each city’s socio-economic structures. Because market 
expansion occurred on both sides of the border without significant political collaboration beyond 
deregulation, the populations of each of these border cities have been exposed to economic 
fluctuations caused by regional integration. Due to the lack of concern for equity, increased social 
stratification has occurred in both cities. For example, despite overall increases in levels of wealth in 
San Diego, social marginalization has risen as well. Rafael Alarcon (2005) reports that from 1990 to 
1998, job growth in the non-targeted industry clusters (71,079 positions) far outdistanced that in the 
targeted industry clusters (36,794).
20 Similarly, the Union Tribune (2004), the city’s newspaper, 
reported that even though unemployment had decreased below six percent, most of the positions that 
encouraged this drop were in precarious or part-time employment which has led to a resulting decrease 
in wages and quality of life, especially among ethnic minorities, including Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans. In fact, geographical studies of the city’s neighbourhoods (i.e. San Diego Association of 
Governments, 2004) show a distinct separation between wealthy districts and poorer ones. Census data 
gathered at the neighbourhood level shows that this gap has significantly increased between 1990 and 2000. 
Tijuana has faced a similar and even more dramatic situation. Despite an increase in overall levels 
of wealth, education and health, wages have been decreasing in the area. In 1993, when the 
maquiladoras first opened in the city, the average wage was US$1.80/hour. This wage has dropped to 
US$1.70/hour since then. Moreover, due to less expensive international competition, Tijuana is losing 
jobs to other parts of the world, most notably China, where wages are almost four times cheaper (less 
than fifty US cents per hour). Between 2000 and 2002, the city’s maquiladora industry cut over 
300,000 jobs.
21 This loss of employment; combined with lower wages, and dynamic demographic 
growth has been a dangerous combination for Tijuana. Entire abusive neighbourhoods, constructed by 
residents without government authorization and usually lacking basic hygienic services, have been 
erected by internal migrants from Mexico’s poorer southern states. City planners estimate a need for 
50,000 new low-cost homes to be built within the year with the same necessity next year.
22 This 
housing shortage has also led to increased crime and violence. Thus, economic and social trends in 
Tijuana mirror those found in San Diego. This can due be attributed to market forces promoted by 
NAFTA, which have created marginalization in both border communities despite the lack of formal 
border integration, such as that which has developed in Bari-Durres. 
Bari-Durres 
Unlike, the previous North American case, one finds numerous examples of political and economic 
collaboration between Bari, Italy and Durres, Albania. In fact, the City of Bari has proclaimed itself ‘A 
Bridge Between East and West.’ Located in the Southern Italian region of Puglia along the Adriatic 
Sea, the city’s economic and political ties have, in fact, been traditionally stronger with counterparts in 
the Balkans than they have with Northern Italian cities. Since the fall of Communism in Albania and 
the ex-Yugoslavia, city, provincial and regional officials have focused on re-establishing these 
historical links in order to improve the area’s economic foundations, which were shaking in the late 
1980’s and early 1990s. One of the closest relationships that has been resuscitated is that with the 
Albanian city of Durres. Like Bari, it is an Adriatic port city with a rich history. Due to Albania’s 
colonial situations, it has passed from one ruler to another thirty-three times. During the early part of 
the century, it was a focal point of the Albanian independence movement, in part due to the 
importance of Italian influences.  
The economy of Durres has been built around trade in the Adriatic Basin and the city’s recent 
history has been marked by its relationship with Italy. In fact, Italians have had a strong interest in the Harlan Koff 
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city since the end of the nineteenth century. For this reason, they significantly invested in the 
independence movement while Albania was ruled by the Austro-Hungarians. During the brief rule of 
King Zog in the 1920s, Italy, and specifically Puglia, contributed large amounts of capital to improve 
infrastructure in the city. Specifically, investments were made to construct wider roads, improve the 
port, and build factories that produced predominantly flour, cigarettes and pasta. Because of these 
interests, the city has been occupied twice by the Italian military, first in 1918, and later under 
Mussolini’s Fascist regime in the 1930s. 
Like San Diego and Tijuana, Bari and Durres underwent significant socio-economic changes 
during a period of regional integration due to the consolidation of the European Union in 1992. The 
fall of Communism in Albania (1991-1992) coincided with the tangentopoli corruption scandals that 
fundamentally altered Italian politics and significantly affected Bari. While Durres was learning to 
cope with a market economy, Bari was addressing the loss of jobs at its three biggest employers: the 
Aquedotto Pugliese, the seaport, and the Fiera del Levante, which were semi-public entities that had 
been mismanaged and defrauded through corruption. 
This situation created economic need on both sides of this water border. Durres, one of the most 
dynamic cities in Europe’s poorest country, and Bari, a poorer Italian city with great potential but 
structural problems, constructed a partnership based on reciprocal interests related to regional 
integration. In fact, these cities have created a working relationship through the private sector, as well 
as through political collaboration on European Union-sponsored programs. This has led to a 
continuous working relationship in various sectors that represents a model of stable political and 
economic border integration. 
In fact, there is great symmetry in the relationship between these two cities. Demographically, Bari 
is the larger metropolitan area with approximately 500,000 inhabitants compared to 350,000 people 
living in the Province of Durres and 180,000 in the city, itself. Both cities rely heavily on foreign trade 
through their ports. More than two million tons of merchandise passes between them each year, which 
represents eighty five percent of Albania’s total import-export.
23  
Both cities have a diversified economy based on the dominance of small firms in various economic 
sectors. Of the 16,501 businesses present in Bari 89.1 percent employ five people or less.
24 Similarly, 
78.5 percent of the 5,844 companies active in Durres employ less than ten people.
25 Moreover, in both 
of these cities, these businesses are spread through different economic sectors. In Bari, forty five 
percent are found in industry, 33.5 percent in commerce and 21.5 percent in services.
26 Outside the 
city, there is a strong agricultural sector based on seasonal labour and small farms. In Durres, 8.9 
percent of the companies are industrial, 49.9 percent are commercial, and 35.8 percent are active in 
services or transportation.
27 
A second structural similarity between Bari and Durres is their reliance on ‘traditional family 
labour.’ Under this model, the family units that live in the areas surrounding these cities are not 
dependent on a single breadwinner. They rely on numerous components of the family working part-
time or precarious jobs. This makes employment flexibility a necessity in order to guarantee the 
security of entire families. Potential for mobility within the local workforce is high in both sectoral 
and geographic terms. Giandomenico Amendola writes: ‘Its [the family’s] flexibility has acted as a 
buffer during periods of economic crisis… in that this labour, which outperforms the urban and less 
reusable workforce, was easily displaced, without a heavy impact on either the local system of 
production or, above all, the political system.’
28 The negative impact of this labour model, however, 
has been the lack of incentives to invest in technology or improved production techniques. 
For these reasons, Bari’s economy has never realized its full potential. Unemployment rates remain 
high at 16.7 percent. This figure is especially dramatic for women (twenty six percent) and young 
people (33.7 percent). Moreover, education levels are low as only 19.3 percent of the city’s working 
population has a high school or university degree.
29 This has contributed to an increase in precarious On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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work and the development of a significant informal economy that includes activities that are ‘not 
regulated by the institutions of society in a legal and social area where similar activities are regulated.’
30 
Because the size of informal markets is a function of flexibility in economic systems, they are 
prominent in both Bari and Durres. Since 1999, more than 1,000 businesses in Bari are denounced for 
‘irregularities’ every year.
31 The informal sector is so important that one local businessman who 
operates in a small town in the suburbs of Bari reports: ‘I am regular and I pay my workers’ 
contributions and my taxes. However, I cannot report all of my sales because I would lose two-thirds 
of my clients. Unfortunately, if I do not sell to these firms, I cannot make a living myself. This is the 
market reality.’
32 A similar situation exists in Durres as Albania’s regulatory agencies are not stable. 
Because of their history of co-operation and present economic symmetry, Bari and Durres have 
become partners in the regional integration of the Adriatic Basin. Numerous protocols have been 
signed by city, provincial and regional officials creating economic partnerships and 
cultural/educational exchanges. The aforementioned Fiera del Levante has organized business fairs in 
Albania aimed at promoting cross-border trade and the Gazetta del Mezzogiorno, Bari’s main 
newspaper has begun publishing special editions in Albanian. 
The largest benefit of this partnership has been the arrival of European Union funding. Both Bari 
and Durres have received EU structural funds to improve their airports, modernize their seaports and 
build roads. The largest sum of thirty-three million Euros was contributed within the framework of the 
Interreg program. The cities were also chosen for participation in the Corridor 8 program aimed at 
constructing rail and auto routes ‘from Northern Europe to the Black Sea.’ This large endeavour will 
eventually connect Bari and Durres with the cities of Tirana, Skopje, Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas and 
Varna. Thus, Bari and Durres have the opportunity to become transportation nodes between Western 
and Southeastern Europe. This demonstrates a true interest in border integration, politically, 
economically and socially. In fact, EU support has not only affected infrastructure and transportation. 
While overall unemployment rates remain high compared to San Diego-Tijuana, they have decreased 
over the last ten years. This reduction of social marginalization has significantly affected migration in 
the area. This point is further developed in the discussions below. 
IV. Contemporary Developments in Border Control Strategies  
Like the literature on regional integration, immigration studies pay significant attention to borders, but 
they rarely focus comparatively on border communities themselves. Authors, such as Alarcon, 
Kopinak, Andreas, and Alegria, have extensively studied local immigration politics along the US-
Mexico border. Similarly, locally focused works (by scholars such as Di Comite, Pace, and Bonifazi) 
have discussed border immigration politics in Europe. Despite these similarities, little dialogue exists 
between these bodies of literature. This paper aims to create this link. Local border immigration 
studies on both European and North American cases accurately argue that while migration discussions 
affect national political debates, border communities are the areas where international developments 
and local citizen concerns intersect. In the sub-field of clandestine migration, most attention is paid to 
discussions pitting public security (migration controls) versus human security (rights of migrants) in 
these areas. 
By comparatively focusing on recent developments in border areas, this paper aims to add a new 
dimension to discussions of migration politics. On one hand, the evidence presented in the previous 
section suggests that local and regional actors follow border strategies that directly contradict control 
policies orchestrated at the national level. Instead, border integration follows models of regional 
integration. Nonetheless, the effects of the logic of control which lies at the base of national migration 
policies in Europe and North America are clearly visible in the border cases discussed in this paper. Harlan Koff 
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Controlling Borders in the EU and North America 
The relationship between development and immigration has already been illustrated in the literature on 
international migration (see Cornelius et. al. 2004, Jamieson and Silj, 1998). Nonetheless, immigration 
policies in Europe and North America largely ignore the relationship between these phenomena. In the 
European Union, despite the activities of the European Parliament and the Commission in areas 
related to social integration and anti-discrimination, the Council, which has ultimate policy-making 
authority in this arena, has focused its attention almost entirely on border controls. 
Since the 2002 Seville Council meeting, the EU has further strengthened its efforts to control its 
external borders. The resolutions passed at this meeting further reinforced the EU’s commitment to 
improving border security. The approved strategies entail the following: 
a)  Harmonizing measures to combat illegal migration: including the creation of a 
common visa identification system; acceleration of the conclusion of readmission 
agreements with specific countries identified by the Council; approval for elements of a 
program on expulsion and repatriation policies, including the optimization of accelerated 
repatriations to Afghanistan; and formal approval for reinforcing the framework for 
suppression of assistance for illegal migration. 
b)  Progressive operationalization of coordinated and integrated administration of 
external borders: including joint operations at  
-  external borders and the creation of government liaison officials for immigration;  
-  drafting a common model of risk analysis;  
-  drafting common training procedures for border police together with consolidation of 
European norms concerning borders; and  
-  drafting a study by the Commission on the administration of external borders. 
c)  Integration of immigration policy in the relations of the Union with third countries: 
including a provision that states that ‘a clause be included concerning the common 
administration of migratory flows and regarding obligatory readmission in the case of 
illegal immigration in all future agreements of co-operation, association or the equivalent 
that the European Union or the European Community signs with any country’;
33 and a 
systematic evaluation of relations with third countries that do not collaborate in the fight 
against illegal immigration. 
Most recently, many EU states have supported the creation of transit camps in third states, such as 
Libya, so that clandestine migrants can be intercepted before they reach Europe’s borders, and in June 
2005, the EU harmonized forced deportation procedures. 
The results of this strategy are clearly evident in the Adriatic Basin. Along the shores of the Region 
of Puglia, the Italian Coast Guard carries out 28,000 hours of navigation and 1,500 helicopter missions 
each year. It also boards approximately 3,500 vessels yearly searching for clandestine migrants.
34 
Immigration policies in the United States have followed a similar pattern. Despite provisions for 
internal migration controls (i.e. employer sanctions) that were included in the 1996 Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, most of the policy changes in the field of immigration have focused on 
preventing the infiltration of the country’s external borders. This is especially true at the border with 
Mexico where the ‘Southwest strategy’ instituted by president Clinton in 1993 and strengthened by 
President George Walker Bush, has created concentrated efforts to regulate border crossings and stop 
clandestine migration. Under this strategy, the budget for the Immigration and Naturalisation Service 
more than tripled, and the Border Patrol has more than doubled in size, making it the second largest 
federal law enforcement agency. Most significantly, this strategy has included the construction of 
three sixty-six mile walls at strategic points of the border, including San Diego-Tijuana, forcing 
clandestine migrants to cross in areas where geographic conditions are harsh including deserts, and 
extremely cold mountainous terrain. On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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Effects of Border Controls 
Since the implementation of more rigid border controls in North America and Europe, illegal 
migration has obviously not stopped. The current stock of clandestine migrants in Europe is estimated 
to be over one million. In the Unites States this stock is approximately 9.3 million, which is twenty six 
percent of the foreign-born population, and five percent of the total workforce. It is estimated that 
300,000 to 400,000 undocumented migrants enter the US every year.
35 
While these strategies have not stopped migration, they have changed its character significantly. 
Scholars of migration both in the Mediterranean and in North America have noted that these measures 
have severely restricted short-term commuter migration and cyclical seasonal migration. Whereas 
legal short-term migration (often daily) was once common in border areas, it now represents just a 
small amount of what it used to be. Moreover, anthropologists conducting work with clandestine 
migrants (i.e. Chavez, 1998) have shown that these workers have reduced their number of yearly 
border crossings for fear of being discovered upon re-entry. This has curtailed return migration as well. 
The biggest impact of these policy developments has been the increase of danger in the migration 
experience. Paradoxically, border controls have significantly reduced the safest and economically 
most productive migration flows while they have stimulated activities in more dangerous clandestine 
migration regimes. Because immigration controls have become sophisticated, human smugglers have 
been forced to further professionalize their networks, increasing transaction costs. For this reason, the 
cost for passage into Europe or the United States has tripled in the last decade. Moreover, because 
smugglers have invested so much in these networks, they often combine this business with other 
criminal activities, such as drug trafficking and the transport of arms or stolen vehicles. Finally, the 
de-humanisation of smuggling through its growth into a multi-national business has led to increased 
amounts of human trafficking for forced labour or the sex industry. 
These assertions are supported by statistics gathered in the border communities included in this 
study, which illustrate the increasingly dangerous nature of contemporary migration experiences. 
Between 1993 and 2003, more than four hundred people have died attempting to cross into California 
from Baja California.
36 Similarly, almost three hundred people died during their crossing from Albania 
into Puglia during the 1990s.
37 Thus, increased attention to border controls have contributed to 
systemic transformations in migration regimes that have created increased threats to both public and 
human security, suggesting the need for an alternative approach to the management of migration flows. 
Recent developments in border communities suggest that multi-level, bi-national co-operation could 
provide an effective strategy to the management of migration. This is the focus of part five, the conclusion. 
V. Conclusion: Improving Border Control Through Border Integration 
In both political and academic debates concerning regional integration and immigration, it is generally 
assumed that these phenomena weaken the ability of nation-states to control their external borders. 
Recent developments in both European and North American politics demonstrate the fear that this 
assumption can create amongst native citizens. For example, in June 2005 a group of citizens in San 
Diego created an association organized to ‘hunt’ clandestine migrants attempting to cross the US-
Mexico border in the rural areas east of the city. While the group’s organizer stated that they would 
contact immigration officials once illegal migrants were identified, he also confirmed that the 
organisation’s members would be armed ‘for their own protection.’ 
This anecdote illustrates how border areas are those most exposed to international phenomena and 
how they are the places where their impacts are felt most strongly. By examining developments in 
these regions, one can effectively study how international phenomena affect local communities and, 
by doing so, identify what mechanisms can be implemented to effectively manage these pressures. By 
comparing models of supranational integration and cross-border co-operation (or lack thereof) at the Harlan Koff 
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sub-national level, this paper attempts to identify sources of power, defined as the ability to manage 
national borders. 
Current immigration policies in Europe and North America have proven to be ineffective and 
dangerous. Not only have they failed to keep would-be migrants out of developed states (see part 
four), they have also cut off the safest and most economically beneficial forms of migration 
(commuter migration) while at the same time feeding clandestine immigration systems. As stated 
earlier, this has made the migration experience more dangerous and increased the importance of 
criminal influences. It has also created a negative atmosphere around migration which has led to 
nativist reactions, such as the one described above. 
The San Diego-Tijuana case presented above illustrates the perverse effects of border control 
strategies and parallel economic development. The physical, political and economic walls that have 
been constructed between these two cities, and others along the US-Mexico border, have actually 
stimulated clandestine migration in the area, which continues without regulation. The number of 
clandestine migrants intercepted at the southwest US-Mexico border increased every year from 1993 
(979,000) to 2001 (1.6 million). After a decline in 2002 and 2003, the number of apprehensions has 
risen again in 2004 to 1.16 million.
38 Scholars of migration flows in the area, most notably Wayne 
Cornelius, have argued that the recent decrease in annual interceptions is more related to the improved 
ability of smugglers to avoid apprehension than it is to deterrence. This interpretation is supported by 
the increase in internal apprehensions in Southern California, (most notably in San Diego, Los 
Angeles and Orange County), the growth in the number of immigrant deaths along the US-Mexico 
border, and the escalation of violence involving competing networks of smugglers, which has resulted 
in murderous attacks on migrants in California, Arizona and New Mexico. The governors of each of 
these states has recently declared states of emergency in their border counties as the amount of border 
crime and the number of migrant deaths in these areas has reached record levels. This would seem to 
indicate that unregulated market expansion encouraged by NAFTA, and the resulting social 
marginalization found in bi-national communities, such as San Diego-Tijuana (both between and 
within the case cities) have stimulated crime and unregulated migration flows in the area. Scholars of 
case regions in Europe characterized by similar political and economic relationships, such as parts of 
the Spanish-Moroccan and German-Polish borders, have noted similar outcomes (see Andreas, Scott). 
This conclusion is also supported by recent ethnographic work with clandestine migrants in the San 
Diego-Tijuana region. According to Tito Alegria, immigration controls have prevented legal 
commuter migration but they have not deterred clandestine migration at all. His research indicates that 
coercion has had little impact on labour decisions made by migrants in the area. Of the trans-national 
migrants that he interviewed, fifty three percent did not have legal papers.
39 Moreover, his project 
showed that Tijuana, itself has become the target for educated and specialized migrants due to its 
recent economic expansion. These internal migrants, in turn, have expressed little overt interest in 
crossing the border, and they usually remain in Mexico. Alegria’s study shows that most of those 
immigrants entering the US clandestinely are those who cross the border because they are caught 
outside of Tijuana’s regular labour market or earning minimum wage, marginalized socio-
economically, and looking for work in San Diego’s informal economy.  
Conversely, the key to immigration management in border areas seems to be tied to bi-national 
development, symmetrical cross-border co-operation between sub-national officials and socio-
economic equity. In Bari-Durress, where border integration has occurred, the impact of political and 
economic development on migration trends is clear. During the early 1990s, between 10,000 and 
20,000 clandestine Albanian migrants were intercepted by the Italian coast guard in the province of 
Bari every year. The high point of these flows was 1996 when 21,000 clandestine migrants were 
caught along local shores. Since then, clandestine migration to Bari has dropped off significantly, 
falling to under 10,000 interceptions annually.
40 Moreover, as smuggling routes were pushed further 
south, the nationalities of those immigrants intercepted significantly changed from Albanians to 
Asians and North Africans, signifying a shift in Albania from a sending country to a transit state. The On the Cutting Edge: Border Integration and Security in Europe and North America 
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number of migrant deaths in the Adriatic Sea has also decreased significantly. This seems to suggest 
that the improved institutional and economic situation in Albania, combined with border patrols, has 
discouraged systemic clandestine migration in the Bari-Durres area. According to one local police 
official: ‘The trafficking rafts full of clandestine migrants don’t arrive in Puglia anymore, not since a 
couple of years ago. Now we find a few kids hidden in the trucks coming from Albania, Greece, and 
Turkey. They are groups of two or three people, usually relatives.’
41 Furthermore, because of the co-
operation between the city of Bari and various partners in the Balkans, there is little ethnic chauvinism 
in the local population. Instead of ‘hunting’ clandestine migrants like their counterparts in San Diego, 
the inhabitants of Puglia, where Bari is located, have been applauded for their reactions to this 
phenomenon and they were even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by the Italian government. 
Regional integration in the Adriatic Basin has not only positively affected border security through 
development, but it has also brought together authorities from different levels of government who 
collaborate institutionally to combat crime in the area. By involving sub-national actors more 
significantly in institutionalized cross-border security discussions, more coherent strategies can be 
developed that link economic development to immigration management and the reduction of criminal 
influences. These phenomena are both trans-national and interconnected by nature so the development 
of policies that recognize these relationships and extend beyond borders is fundamental. Sub-national 
actors can become an integral part of this process. For example, in August 2005 the governors of the 
US state of New Mexico and the Mexican state of Chihuahua agreed to raze the small town of Las 
Chepas, a strategic border point for human smugglers, commit state funds to border security and share 
local law enforcement information. More significantly, they renewed discussions concerning the 
development of the bi-national border region.  
Unfortunately, the use of soft power is currently being ignored by European and American leaders 
in the creation of migration control strategies. Soft power focuses on the socio-economic context that 
surrounds migration politics and it provides a coherent approach to migration management within the 
framework of regional development strategies promoted by the EU and NAFTA. Most studies of 
border communities, including this one, in fact suggest that these areas are characterized by inter-
institutional conflict as sub-national leaders often follow economic development incentives that 
contradict national security strategies. Moreover, as the above-mentioned recent developments in the 
American southwest demonstrate, local communities often bare the financial and political costs of 
ineffective border control strategies based on coercion and deterrence.  
This study demonstrates that national policies do not dictate development in border communities. 
Instead, the cases presented in this study indicate that contemporary developments closely reflect the 
interaction of local interests and supranational models of regional integration. This integration, as well 
as economic globalization, in general, is a phenomenon that worries many native citizens in developed 
states, who in turn pressure their representatives to invest human and financial resources in expensive 
border controls. However, this paper shows that short-sighted and unbalanced development strategies 
in border areas, rather than regional integration, are responsible for challenges to border security in 
these communities, such as clandestine migration. Recently, the Mayor of the US border city, 
Douglas, Arizona, stated, ‘I have seen illegal immigration all my life. Illegal immigration has a life of 
its own. You can’t stop it.’
42 Instead, of continually trying to do so, it seems time to change course and 
address the underlying causes of this phenomenon. The evidence from this comparative study of 
border communities would suggest that cross-border development contributes to the reinforcement of 
border security both structurally and economically. Thus, accelerating border integration would 
actually by the most effective means of border control. 
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